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Introduction 
 
This chapter marks the start of the substantive analysis of how the ‘War on Terror’ 
was possible.  It assesses the role of foreign policy discourse in the immediate post 9-
11 period, through a consideration of the notions ‘void’ and ‘crisis’.  It does so by 
exploring the impact of the events of 11 September 2001 and the start of the ‘War on 
Terror’ in the unique American context.  The chapter focuses on the interplay of the 
cultural and discursive context with the (perceived) events themselves, as well as the 
agency of politicians and the public to generate meaning. The simple fact that the 
‘War on Terror’ was begun in the United States is an important reminder of the 
significance of the American context.  The events of 9-11 took place in the US and 
the ‘War on Terror’ was born through the words of politicians situated within (a 
uniquely stunned) American society.  The decision that faced British and Australian 
practitioners was not whether to launch a ‘War on Terror’, but whether or not to join 
the US-led coalition.  As the principal member of the coalition, founder of the ‘War 
on Terror’ and location of the ‘terrorist attack’ that inspired it, the unique American 
experience after 9-11 requires elaboration if we are to understand how the ‘War on 
Terror’ was possible. 
 
This chapter does not follow the comparative approach of subsequent chapters.  It 
does however move us towards an understanding of how the ‘War on Terror’ was 
possible and facilitates the comparative analysis that follows.  Here, it is simply not 
possible to explore public reactions in the UK and Australia way as the US as the data 
simply does not exist.  Limited limited insights can be drawn from media and 
(archived) internet sources (alongside official language) to indicate that such an 
exploration might not necessary.  Although shocking, Britons and Australians did not 
experience the events of 11 September 2001 in equally personal or incomprehensible 
ways.1  Instead, as the following chapter will argue, the British response articulated 
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that the scale of 9-11 was shocking, rather than the existence of terrorism or the 
successful striking of a Western nation.  This can be understood in respect of a British 
foreign policy culture that is familiar with the experience of terrorism in a way that 
the US is not.2  Thus, in Britain, an existing language for comprehending terrorism 
ensured a highly mediated ‘void’.3  Similarly, in Australia, 9-11 was ‘read’ through a 
longstanding Hobbesian geographical imagination: 9-11 was further proof that the 
world beyond Australian borders was dangerous.  For Australians, having recently 
survived the Asian financial crisis and intervention in East Timor, 9-11 was the latest 
‘shock’ to the West and the Anglosphere of which Australia was intimately a part.  
These differences are picked up on in chapter 5, where we return to a comparative 
empirical investigation.  Here, however, it is imperative to investigate the complex 
relationship between American politicians, the media and society with regards to the 
events of 11 September 2001.  The ‘War on Terror’ was, after all, born in these 
moments in this state. 
 
This chapter attempts to ‘soften’ the hard break in history that official foreign policy 
discourse has written into ‘9-11’, whilst taking seriously the ethical task of 
recognising the experiences and voices of ‘ordinary Americans’.  The chapter begins 
by introducing the terms ‘void’ and ‘crisis’, addressing some important if misplaced 
criticisms of the former, and restating the centrality of issues of agency, resonance 
and culture to the analysis.  The chapter is subsequently organised around the 
moments of ‘void’ and ‘crisis’.  The first half of the chapter investigates and theorises 
the nature of the post 9-11 ‘void’ in two principal stages.  Firstly, the investigation of 
the ‘void’ begins by exploring the unusually personal nature of 9-11 and the possible 
reasons it may have both been experienced as such at the time and constructed as such 
afterwards.  Secondly, the theorisation of the ‘void’ continues by considering the pre-
existing ‘truths’ of American security culture that were seemingly shattered on the 
morning of 11 September 2001.  This half of the chapter thus explores the American 
contextual (cultural) condition – characterised by a lack of organising discourses – in 
which the official and successful narration of 9-11 would occur.  I ague that the void 
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was characterised by a lack of harmonised meaning in the immediate aftermath of 11 
September 2001, due to the failure of language and a particular American cultural 
context.  Where partial meanings were achieved they were often highly 
individualised, with viewers frequently drawing on popular cultural sources and latent 
understandings. 
 
Having explored the ‘nature’ of the void, its impact is assessed.  It is argued that the 
discursive vacuum not only heightened the significance of attempts to frame foreign 
policy, but also that the ‘nature’ of the void enabled, shaped and constrained attempts 
by politicians and the media to frame events.  Crucially, the initial 
incomprehensibility that characterised the void was seized upon as 9-11 went from 
being incomprehensible to inexplicable.  The second half of the chapter thus considers 
the first stage of the framing process – the construction of 9-11 as crisis – drawing on 
the work of Jenny Edkins, Stuart Croft, Colin Hay and Gerard Toal.  It is argued that 
through the construction of crisis – through a decisive intervention that re-established 
‘politics’ over ‘the political’ – the events of 11 September 2001 became ‘9-11’, 
whereby 9-11 serves as a somatic marker of crisis.  As a somatic marker, ‘9-11’ 
circumvents possibilities for critical reflection or debate, bringing to the fore a range 
of highly reductive tacit geopolitical assumptions and arguments. That 9-11 might 
seem self-evidently to be a moment or marker of crisis is something that must be 
made strange.  In tracing and theorising the shift from void to crisis, this section thus 
serves to denaturalise the first and prerequisite stage of the response to 9-11, enabling 
an understanding of how the ‘War on Terror’ was possible and opening a critical 
space for its contestation.4   
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Time and 9-11 
 
There are two common responses to 9-11.  Firstly, the notion that 9-11 was a date on 
which everything changed.5  Secondly, the notion that 9-11 was a date on which 
nothing changed at all.6  Time then seems to be central to thinking and talking about 
9-11, even when temporal conceptualisations are left implicit.  These two antecedent 
tendencies are prevalent amongst both the official responses of practitioners and 
media framings but also in the reflections of academic analyses.7  However, for the 
vast majority of the US general public in the wake of 9-11, once the initial confusion 
began to be replaced with harmonised meaning, 9-11 clearly represented a temporal 
rupture.  Noting this, two principal concerns are investigated and addressed 
throughout the chapter.  Firstly, the chapter deals with issues of agency – both of 
practitioners and the media but importantly also the general public – considering 
issues of framing and resonance in an unusual post 9-11 context that was both 
selective and informing. Secondly, the chapter considers issues of temporality and 
rupture at a cultural and discursive level; the cultural shock and discursive failure 9-
11 induced during the ‘void’ and the strategic writing of temporality in the 
construction of 9-11 as crisis.8   
 
The term ‘void’ suggests a ‘phase’ and connects to wider debates on the temporality 
of 9-11.  The notion of the ‘void’ represents the immediate post 9-11 confusion 
experienced by the vast majority of ‘viewers’ as language failed to adequately or 
consistently regulate the meaning of the unfolding events.9  It does not imply, as 
critics of the term may suggest, that there existed a total lack of meaning after 9-11.  
Rather, it suggests a lack of homogenised meaning, governed by relatively systematic 
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meaning production: a discursive void.  The term also raises the question of 
‘uniqueness’.  Can other events be described as inducing a ‘void’?  Do all events lead 
to a process of meaning generation that characterises a void, perhaps as a result of 
their inevitable lack of essence?  While other events may generate a void, it is an 
unusual condition requiring the perception of disproved cultural ‘truths’.  In this, 9-11 
was arguably unique and at the least very unusual.  It was the first time in sixty years 
that Americans had witnessed their vulnerability, at the hands of an external enemy, 
on their own soil.   
 
Although it is possible to state that the void generally began once viewers had 
‘witnessed’ the events, it is not possible to state when the void ended; it ended at 
different times for different people.  For some, it ended abruptly; for others, it was 
replaced slowly as comprehension gradually became possible.  Attempts to fill the 
void, frame events and load 9-11 with meaning began almost immediately as news 
channels ran suggestive rolling headlines.10  On the evening of 9-11 President Bush 
delivered his first ‘considered’ articulation of what would become the dominant ‘War 
on Terror’ discourse.  At this time, even Bush was struggling to find the words to 
create a compelling narrative.11  By 20 September, however, building on the growing 
and solidifying official response discourse, Bush was able to deliver a crucial and 
compelling framing of 9-11 as crisis, simultaneously filling the events with meaning 
and articulating the solution to the underlying morbid condition they represented.  As 
such articulations began to resonate with the population,12 the incomprehensibility of 
9-11 that characterised the void was replaced by the harmonisation and hegemony of 
meaning production that characterised the construction of 9-11 as crisis.  In 
articulating 9-11 as crisis, the act of its construction was erased from memory and the 
void it filled was partially forgotten as it was retrospectively re-imagined. 
 
It is imperative to de-objectify and ‘soften’ the constructed temporality of ‘9-11’ as 
rupture, revealing the writing of discontinuity that the discursive construction of 9-11 
as crisis entailed.  It is also imperative, however, to question and refute the notion that 
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nothing changed on 9-11.  Arguably, to imply such a scenario fails to acknowledge 
the agency of those viewers – the US general public – who experienced considerable 
trauma on 9-11.  A genealogical approach, tracing discursive continuities from 
Clinton’s (and earlier presidents’) employment of pre-emptive arguments through to 
the language of the ‘War on Terror’, would risk overlooking the significance of the 
context that informed the selective and strategic re-articulation of such earlier 
arguments.  This is not to argue that the void was a natural, objective condition.  
Rather it is to argue that the void was an organic cultural condition that logically 
followed from events which existing discourses failed to regulate.  Had US foreign 
policy culture and/or discourse been different, the void may well have not occurred.  
But given the existing US security culture and the failure of language to adequately 
‘manage’ 9-11, it is unsurprising the events generated a void within which the 
construction of 9-11 as crisis would have to occur.13 
 
Within the context of the void, the agency of politicians, the media and the general 
public was brought to the fore.  The agency of the media and foreign policy 
practitioners was especially crucial in framing 9-11 given the lack of competing 
discursive structures.14  The dominant framings of the events and the construction of 
9-11 as crisis were not inevitable, but instead relied on the strategic agency of foreign 
policy practitioners and the media.  The agency of the general public was similarly 
significant, initially as the level of meaning production shifted to the individual – with 
‘latent narratives’ emerging as the dominant sense-making mechanism – and 
increasingly as ‘viewers’ evaluated cultural expectations with reference to emerging 
official framings of 9-11.  While startlingly widespread, resonance was not 
unanimous.  Important dissenting voices were heard.  As stressed in chapter 2, in a 
democracy such as the US, going to war is such a costly exercise that it requires 
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‘widespread public consent or at least acquiescence’.15  Official framings drew upon 
the cultural condition of the void and widely understood foreign policy traditions to, 
very effectively, maximise popular resonance.  As the construction of 9-11 as crisis 
gained popular resonance, harmonising and regulating the meaning of the events, the 
void was filled and 9-11 retrospectively became a moment the world changed.  
 
 
Void 
 
Failure of Discourse 
 
Why is it that analyses of 9-11 so often begin with personal reflections and 
recollections of the events which unfolded that day?16  It is unusual for academic 
analyses to begin in such a way.  Firstly, perhaps, it is because the (immediately 
perceived and retrospectively afforded) scale, significance and nature of the events 
are such that 9-11 is a date for which people can recall what happened, where they 
were and their personal experience of the day.  Crucially, however, this importance 
has coupled with an explanation of 9-11 founded on the (paradoxical) assumption that 
the events are inexplicable.  Diken and Lausten lament the fact that 9-11 has been 
elevated to a level of Absolute Evil, similarly to the Holocaust.17  This elevation 
places the events beyond the potential for understanding.  Once regarded as pure evil, 
analysing and explaining 9-11 is seen as futile, impossible and even as apologising for 
the conduct of evil.18  It is thus possible to see how, in the weeks and months after 9-
11, attempts to understand the events became equated with a lack of US patriotism.19  
Perhaps in implicit anticipation of a cacophony of disapproving voices, citing a lack 
of patriotism (the ultimate post 9-11 sin), authors have attempted to circumvent 
criticism by proving that they too recognise that the events cannot be understood 
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through objective analysis and that they must revert to the smallest scale of 
understanding, the individual, in order to recreate the events of 9-11.  In short, 
because (as will be shown) 9-11 has been constructed as inexplicable, analyses have 
tacitly recognised this through an unusual tendency to begin academic inquiry with 
personal accounts and recollections of the day. 
 
Secondly, analyses of 9-11 are personalised because that is how the events were 
‘lived’.  9-11 was not widely foreseen; it came as a shock to the American people and 
the watching world.20  Established truths of US security culture were disproved as 
symbols of US political and economic strength were successfully targeted.  
Witnessing large-scale carnage on US soil invalidated notions of anarchy and chaos 
existing outside of America.  Whether the outside had permeated the inside – and 
history had returned to the US – or the inside was turning in on itself was not 
immediately known.21  This incomprehensibility, the lack of certainty over what the 
events were – what they meant, symbolised and implied – arose due to the difficulty, 
and often impossibility, of subsuming the events within existing frameworks of 
intelligibility.   
 
The lack of appropriate discourse(s) to make sense of 9-11 in its immediate aftermath 
meant that where cues were taken they came from unofficial sources and ‘lower’ 
levels of cultural life.  Religion, films and personal forms of knowledge were drawn 
upon as viewers struggles to comprehend 9-11 took place at the level of the individual 
in contrast to the more commonplace intersubjective understandings that are produced 
through discursive regularities.  As Hansen summarises, discourses regulate the 
production of meaning in a relatively systematic way where language becomes 
comparatively stable.22  Unable to be incorporated into existing discourses, the events 
of 9-11 were quite literally ‘unspeakable’: language failed.23  Personal understandings 
substituted for the lack of a discourse capable of persuasively articulating the events 
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and fixing a shared meaning.  As Callahan et al. argue, ‘in lieu of a clearly posited 
narrative, human thought is structured by the latent narrative that emerges from the 
individual’s underlying story about the way the world operates. Thus one’s own latent 
narrative emerges as the sense-making mechanism if no other coherent narrative is 
proffered’.24  These latent narratives drew upon personal experiences alongside wide 
and varied popular cultural sources in an attempt to inscribe meaning onto events.25  
Personal accounts of 9-11 and the heightened use of popular cultural sources to 
generate meaning thus reflect the fact that both the media and political elites fell silent 
in the face of an event which could not readily be incorporated into pre-existing 
foreign policy discourse(s).  Succinctly, personal accounts are symptomatic of the 
discursive void induced by 9-11 and the subsequent re-construction of that void, 
which occurred with the elevation of 9-11 to a position of Absolute Evil as part of the 
articulation of crisis.   
 
 
Silence and Security Culture 
  
‘Suddenly, a sleek silvery flying object appeared from the left-hand side of the 
TV screen, approaching the other Twin Tower. Before the eye could recognize 
it as a passenger airplane (or even if it did, the mind obstinately refused to 
acknowledge it), it violently penetrated the upper third of the building and 
disappeared in a red-orange-and-black ball of fire surging against the crispy 
blue autumnal sky’.26   
 
The official assessment of 9-11 records the fact that the events could happen as ‘a 
failure of imagination’.27  Arva recalls that even as the events unfolded they were hard 
to imagine.  Firstly, for ‘viewers’, this generated disbelief: “I didn’t know what was 
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 Callahan, K. Dubnick, M. and Olshfski, D. ‘War Narratives: Framing Our Understanding of the War 
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 See Croft, Culture, for a detailed account of how popular cultural sources were used to fix the 
meaning of 9-11. 
26
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going on”;28 “I couldn’t believe it”;29 “I didn’t believe it at”.30  Secondly, it inspired 
denial:  
“I was overwhelmed.  It seemed like something from a movie.  It could not be 
real; it had to be something from a movie … I knew it was real, but a part of 
me didn’t want to believe it”.31 
“[I]t couldn’t be true, it had to be Hollywood”.32 
Having ‘no correspondence in the existing discourse of the time’, events were met 
with a mixture of disbelief and denial.33  This led to a situation in which, although 
clearly significant as they contradicted the widely held view that the US was ‘exempt 
from this kind of violence’,34 the events could not be articulated and were thus 
relatively meaning-less.  As one interviewee described it, “the weight of imagining” 
was too great; there were no words:35 
 “It was unspeakable”.36 
“What stands out is the lack of information that’s being given to the media, by 
the media, to the people”.37  
“[It] made it difficult to talk … speaking clearly wasn’t really happening at 
that point, it was very difficult”.38 
The effect of this inability to articulate the events – to place them within an existing 
foreign policy discourse – was to prevent an understanding of them.  Confusion, 
numbness and a void in meaning dominated the immediate experience of 9-11 for 
many watching Americans: 
“[It was] so unbelievable that it didn’t want to sink in”.39 
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  Adam Gospodarek, ‘Witness and Response Collection’, US Library of Congress American Folklife 
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 Hunter Farrell, ‘Witness and Response’ (SR321, 22 October 2001). 
36
 Dan Hiller, ‘Witness and Response’ (SR381, 15 September 2001). 
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“At first I wasn’t angry, because I couldn’t believe what was happening”.40 
“I felt nothing because I couldn’t understand”.41 
 
Where partial understandings were achieved, rather than from foreign policy 
discourse, they were generally taken from popular cultural sources.  Science fiction, 
horror shows and movies, as well as songs, poems and religious faith were all drawn 
upon to fill the events with meaning.   
“[It was] so sci-fi”.42 
“[M]y mind went to ‘War of the Worlds’”.43 
“I didn’t believe it at first … I was waiting for the lights to go up and some 
director to say ‘cut’ or something.  It was like out of a movie; like 
Independence Day”.44 
“It was like something out of a horror show”,45 
Citizens turned to personal levels of understanding and popular cultural sources of 
meaning due to the lack of prevalent discourses capable of adequately articulating the 
events.  ‘[I]n countries such as the United States and the United Kingdom, the media 
are a part of the co-production of security discourse.’46  ‘In the immediate aftermath 
of 9/11, however, commentators struggled to establish adequate historical frames of 
reference, that is, to place ‘media templates’ over the unfolding coverage to shape 
explanations’.47  In fact, the incomprehensibility of 9-11 was reinforced by the media, 
through images (on television, in newspapers and magazines of witnesses to the event 
‘looking speechlessly… in lieu of language’.48   
 
 
‘Voiceless’ images and the media hush more generally were compounded by elected 
representatives as a ‘strangely ominous silence filled the discursive space where 
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political declarations were expected’.49  9-11 fell outside of prevalent existing 
discourses; it could not easily be subsumed within the definitions, parameters and 
storylines of existing frameworks of intelligibility.  Both the media and political elites 
refrained or were unable to place the events into a meaningful and coherent discourse; 
thus, the two principal (and expected) generators of meaning fell silent.  This lack of 
an appropriate language, the silence of elected representatives and the resulting 
sparsity of background understanding for witnesses to contextualise the events left 
Americans ‘baffled’.50 
 
John Troyer, writing only seventeen days after 9-11, encapsulates the nature of the 
void and the feeling that ‘September 11 strode onstage without lines, without script, 
without character’:51  
‘I have read the same story, in different news sources, attempting to create a 
language that adequately describes the events. While every term imaginable to 
describe violence, death, grief and anxiety is still in use by most Americans, 
the words are not helping to make sense of the situation … this persistent 
repetition of language [generates] a frustration about the inability to accurately 
define a 17-day-long stream of transient information.   
The language of everyday life seems entirely irrelevant given the inability to 
even categorize Sept. 11, 2001, as anything other than Sept. 11, 2001 … Sept. 
11, 2001, is a singular day that resides in the present without a proper name, 
embedding no specific meanings other than that words do not adequately 
articulate the shock ... The accustomed uses of language to make impossible 
events seem real for the American public via television, newspaper and radio 
sources are breaking down.’52 
Troyer’s article is incredibly erudite given the general lack of critical analysis that 
existed in the immediate wake of 9-11.53  With hindsight, Troyer raises three 
important points.  Firstly, Troyer recognises that attempts in the media to cover and 
understand events fuelled incomprehensibility.  As the Bush administration set about 
narrating the response, and constructing crisis, ‘incomprehensibility’ became a widely 
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accepted feature of 9-11 and was incorporated into the official foreign policy 
discourse of the response.  The void – as a void in meaning – was actually used in the 
construction of the response as, through foreign policy discourse, 9-11 went from 
being incomprehensible to inexplicable.  Secondly, in noting the breakdown of ‘the 
accustomed uses of language’, Troyer highlights the failings of ‘official politics’ and 
the shift to ‘the political’ that 9-11 wrought.54   Thirdly, Troyer’s use of ‘Sept. 11 
2001’ is striking in its unfamiliarity.  The dominant shorthand abbreviation has 
become (an almost universally adopted) ‘9-11’.  ‘9-11’ has come to act as a somatic 
marker of crisis.55  Before turning to explore the second and third points in theorising 
the construction of crisis, the first observation requires further elaboration. 
 
The void that 9-11 created resulted from two primary factors: the shattering of the 
foundational myths of US security culture and the resulting silence of both the media 
and political elites. ‘Violence of this magnitude collided with, and mutually excluded, 
almost two hundred years, the subconscious reality and awareness of being isolated 
from a chaotic world.’56  The security culture of the US has propagated a belief in 
invulnerability.  Sheltered behind two vast oceans,57 the US as a self-perceived ‘island 
exempt from this kind of violence, witnessing it only from the safe distance of the TV 
screen’ became ‘directly involved’ on September 11th, 2001; ‘old security seemed to 
be momentarily shattered’.58   
 
The shattering of American security culture was foremost in shaping the reactions of 
the general public to 9-11.  As interviewee Eric Offner noted, the experience of 9-11 
“has to be set off against what one has been conditioned to”.59  People were 
“completely shocked it was a terrorist attack”60 precisely because Americans “had no 
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contact with that”.61  The fact that 9-11 occurred in America was what generated 
much of interviewees’ incomprehension: 
“I can’t believe it … it’s happening here, in the US.  You see these things out 
there, but not here in your own country”.62 
“I’m still in a state of shock; I don’t believe this could happen on American 
soil”.63 
“[Y]ou know in our country we have never been actually threatened, except 
for one time”.64 
 
Americans were accustomed to seeing images of chaos, violence and terrorism ‘out 
there’, but not ‘here’.  American security culture located the dangers of anarchy away 
from the US both geographically and historically.  Often, images of 9-11 were greeted 
with spatial or temporal distanciation, perceived either as “news from some other 
country”65 or with the assumption that “it was something in history”.66  Although 
witnessing the destruction of the Twin Towers and the Pentagon on fire, the events 
remained difficult to comprehend, as no overarching official discourse existed to fix 
meaning to them.  Rather, US security culture was dominated by an illusion of 
invulnerability that had flourished during the ‘interwar years’ following the Cold 
War.67  ‘The indispensable nation’ was increasingly accustomed to enjoying the 
confidence and security of its ‘unipolar moment’.  This confidence culminated in the 
myth that the US was untouched and untouchable.68  9-11, interpreted accordingly, 
destroyed that myth, and shattered the truths of American security culture. 
“I did not really believe it because we live in the United States and basically 
the whole concept of living in the United States is freedom, living in a very 
sheltered world where you just never would think of a war, or attack … I have 
always felt safe in America … [now] I don’t know if I could necessarily say if 
I am safe … a lot of people in America were feeling so secure, they were 
feeling like the US is invincible … we are not invincible … we need to get out 
                                                 
61
 Jenny Fan, ‘Witness and Response’ (SR247, 18 October 2001). 
62
 Jorge Vila Senor, ‘Witness and Response’ (SR015, 11 October 2001). 
63
 Travis Farley, ‘Witness and Response’ (SR242, 13 October 2001). 
64
 Dan Hiller, ‘Witness and Response’ (SR381, 15 September 2001). 
65
 Victoria Castello, ‘Witness and Response’ (SR321, 19 October 2001). 
66
 Neil Waters, ‘Witness and Response’ (SR025, 27 October 2001). 
67
 Choller, D. and Goldgeier, J. America Between the Wars, (New York: Perseus Books, 2008). 
68
 “I feel spoiled; that I’ve been a spoilt American … we’re an untouched, unspoiled culture”.  Monroe 
Grayson, ‘Witness and Response’ (SR327, 1 November 2001). 
 15
of our bubble and realise that we are just in the same ballpark as everyone 
else”.69 
“[I] couldn’t believe it; these are people, these are Americans … Americans 
think we’re invulnerable, we’re like superman, you know?  We’re too good 
for that … we, as anyone else, can be affected by these events”.70 
“[T]his has made everyone open their eyes … We are not invincible”.71 
“We no longer appear to be chosen people.  We are just as susceptible to mass 
devastation as any other part of the world”.72 
 
That such enduring, deeply held assumptions about the nature of American security 
were so obviously disproved caused widespread alarm and made talking of the events 
difficult.  ‘The emergence of events which could not be domesticated, symbolised or 
integrated within the discourse’ caused both foreign policy practitioners and the 
media (the two expected sources of meaning) to fall silent.73  However, as the 
response was formulated this incomprehensibility – the impossibility of incorporating 
9-11 into the logic of an existing foreign policy discourse – was seized upon.  The 
media and foreign policy practitioners worked in symbiosis to transform an 
incomprehensible event into an inexplicable event. 9-11 went from making no sense, 
to being beyond any justification and impervious to understanding.  As Morris 
summarises: 
‘Repetitious broadcasting also made [the events] resistant to analysis. 
Saturating every television screen, they seemed to testify only to the 
incomprehensibility of the event/image. This was quickly mobilized for 
ideological effect, so that the incomprehensibility of the image/event also 
became a way of conveying the idea that the terrorist act is that which exceeds 
moral calculation ... the event quickly became its image, and questions of 
causality were consequently deferred along with the need for reading. The 
substitution was made possible by virtue of those other substitutions on which 
photographic logics rest: of appearance for truth, of what can be seen for what 
can be known.’74  
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The manipulation of the void by foreign policy practitioners and the media in the 
discourse of the response is an important and infrequently acknowledged move.  
Where scholars, such as Diken and Lausten, do criticise the policing of ‘acceptable 
knowledge’ of the events, rarely are the initial factors that gave rise to this situation 
considered.75  The context of the void – as a void in meaning – provided the situation 
in which such a construction was possible.  Drawing on the widely perceived belief 
that 9-11 defied existing understandings (of America, the world and their 
relationship), the construction of 9-11 confirmed that the events were indeed beyond 
the parameters of understanding.  By transforming 9-11 from an incomprehensible 
event to an inexplicable attack, numerous features of the response were naturalised.76  
This transformation was one, particularly important, framing of 9-11 that underpinned 
a series of subsequent discursive moves.  These moves helped to render a contingent 
response common sense and began by reaffirming the mastery of politics over the 
political by constructing 9-11 as a somatic marker of crisis.   
 
 
Crisis 
 
Reinstating Politics 
 
‘Politics’, for Jenny Edkins, marks the arena of ‘elections, political parties, the doings 
of governments and parliaments, the state apparatus, and in the case of international 
politics, treaties, international agreements, diplomacy, wars, institutions of which 
states are members and the actions of statesmen and women.’77  ‘The political’, on the 
other hand, ‘has to do with the establishment of that very social order which sets out a 
particular, historically specific account of what counts as politics and defines other 
areas of social life as not politics’.78  ‘September 11 has been one of these situations 
of the political that suspended, though temporarily, the stable arena of politics’.79  For 
Peker, the 9-11 void saw ‘the disintegration of discursive structures, social meanings, 
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and subject positions; where hegemonic intervention to rearticulate them surface[d] as 
an urgent necessity’.80  It was, for Peker, ‘the moment of global crisis overcome by 
the act of founding a new harmony’.81  This interpretation, however, belies the 
construction that resides in the identification of crisis; constructing a crisis was, in 
fact, the first stage of the response, not the condition upon which the response was 
formulated.  Moreover, it was only with the founding of a new ‘harmony’ – the 
articulation of a new trajectory – that 9-11 was retrospectively constituted as crisis. 
‘The concept of ‘crisis’ is most welcome in this sense because it represents a 
situation in which our everyday beliefs of how the world works are rigorously 
disrupted by an event that is out of our control.  In that sense, it can be 
compared to trauma, i.e. a situation that is hard to describe and yet demands to 
be communicated: ‘... it is outside the frameworks of normal social reality and 
thus outside the linguistic and other symbolic tools we have at our disposal for 
making sense of the world’’.82 
This ‘demand to be communicated’ and the ‘urgent necessity’ of articulating are 
central to an understanding of 9-11 as crisis.  It has been argued that 9-11 generated a 
discursive void as the events could not readily be subsumed into existing foreign 
policy discourse.  However, 9-11, in and of itself, was not a crisis.  Initially 
unregulated by discourse, the ‘events’ did not mean anything for certain.  Instead 9-11 
became a crisis through a process of discursive construction which reinstated 
‘politics’ over ‘the political’. Crises, I argue, are constructed. 
 
Using Edkin’s terminology, 9-11 was a ‘political moment’.  A political moment is a 
founding, open and contingent moment in which the political order and community 
are constituted. In this moment ‘acts’ are foundationless: they are just ‘acts’.83  
Crucially, however, the constructed meaning of ‘acts’ and the newly forged political 
reality are veiled in the writing of history; the openness of the interregnum ends with 
the re-establishment of politics over the political and this re-establishment demands 
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the process of establishing becomes retrospectively invisible.84  To become invisible, 
foundational myths of the new political reality must be widely accepted.85  With such 
resonance, the ascription of meaning to acts, the re-establishing of politics over the 
political and the very contingency of the interregnum are forgotten.  Re-opening the 
contingency of the 9-11 void is an important step to understanding how the new 
political reality of the ‘War on Terror’ was possible; it requires an appreciation of the 
process of constructing 9-11 as a crisis, a process which filled the ‘acts’ with meaning 
and, crucially, articulated the solution.  
 
So what is a crisis?  9-11 was not, self-evidently, a crisis.  9-11 became a moment of 
crisis.  However, as I have argued, 9-11 did herald a discursive void as the ‘American 
post-cold-war security order discourse collapsed under the new challenge’ and the 
‘expected sources’ of meaning fell silent.86  Despite the silence that followed such a 
stark disproving of the previously perceived certainties of US security culture, 9-11 
‘demanded resolution through a new understanding’.87  This demand was met through 
a ‘discursive shift ... initiated by those with social power [and] reproduced by 
others’.88  The new policies of the ‘War on Terror’ were set under way not by the 
‘acts’ or ‘events’ of 9-11 themselves, but through the discursive construction of 9-11 
as crisis by those with social power.  Elected representatives, as foreign policy 
practitioners, acted as issuers of statements in a Foucauldian sense; they acted as 
‘experts’ whose words spoke truth.  These statements drew on each other, supported 
each other and together comprised a logical and coherent system of statements that 
regulated meaning in a coherent way.89  This system of statements (an emerging and 
solidifying discourse) proffered foundational myths and meta-narratives capable of 
subsuming the events, re-constructing the political order and the political community.  
All of this was crucial to the unfolding ‘War on Terror’.  It belies, however, the 
double articulation at the heart of the initial construction of 9-11 as crisis: the 
simultaneous identification of both the problem and the solution.  9-11 was a political 
moment; sovereignty, which had been so bluntly put into question through the use of 
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illegitimate violence, was reasserted and performed.  It was also, however, 
retrospectively constituted as a moment of both dusk and dawn;90 9-11 became an 
historical moment, a moment of crisis, when events marked the end of one era and the 
start of the next.  9-11 was interpreted and constructed as a day when the world 
changed.91  Articulating this change and the new era required a decisive intervention, 
without which 9-11 could not have been constructed as a crisis.  
 
 
Decisive Intervention 
 
The term ‘crisis’ is frequently deployed, rhetorically rich and attention grabbing; it 
‘has an immense lay, media and academic currency’.92  However, the term is also 
‘illusive, vague, imprecise, malleable, open-ended and generally unspecified’.93  Hay 
suggests that the term’s ubiquity may even derive from ‘this notorious imprecision’.94  
In social and political academic literature, the term is frequently understood as ‘an 
accumulation of contradictions’.95  To understand crisis as a process and product of 
discursive construction, Hay turns to consider the etymology of the term in an attempt 
to ‘inject some (long overdue) conceptual clarity’.96  Tracing ancient Greek usage of 
the term, Hay notes that crisis was invoked to describe ‘the moment in the course of 
the disease at which it is determined whether the patient will recover’.97  Thus the 
‘contradictory constellation, is however, held to represent an opportunity for a healing 
transformation’.98   
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Crisis appears perhaps most frequently in Marxist, neo-Marxist and post-Marxist state 
theory.99  It is here that crisis is most frequently identified as a self-evident 
accumulation of contradictions.  Hay rejects this ‘dominant and purely objectivist 
view of crisis, which conflates, and in certain cases actually equates, contradiction 
and crisis’.100  In tracing the etymology of crisis, Hay identifies crises as a moment of 
objective contradiction and subjective intervention.101  Whilst the assertion of 
‘objective contradiction’ derives from Hay’s ontological position, ‘the crucial point is 
that a given constellation of contradictions can sustain a multitude of differing and 
incommensurate conceptions of crisis’.102  Thus, a crisis is a strategic moment;103 the 
events of 9-11 had to be perceived and constructed as a rupture, but simultaneously, 
9-11 was ‘perceived as a moment in which a decisive intervention can, and perhaps 
must, be made’.104  This perception must occur at the level at which the crisis is 
identified; by actors capable of delivering a response to the problems they identify.105  
In short, to be constructed as a crisis, 9-11 required a decisive intervention to be 
made, which articulated the events ‘as ‘symptom’-atic of a more general condition of 
crisis’106 and a ‘War on Terror’, conducted through the agency of the American 
military led by President Bush, as the solution to the impasse. 
 
‘A crisis is therefore itself constructed in and through social interaction.  It is 
given meaning through social processes, through a decisive intervention which 
gives meaning to the situation and which also provide a route for future 
policy.  That is, there are no objective ontological criteria that a crisis must 
fulfil to be a crisis: a crisis is one when it permeates discourse, and creates 
new understandings and, thereby, new policy programmes’.107 
 
‘Crisis, then, is a moment and process of transformation’; the shifting of historical 
epochs is written in the construction of crises.108  ‘If we are to understand’ the project 
of the ‘War on Terror’ that followed ‘we must start by considering the moment of 
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crisis itself’.109  Crisis, like the subsequent stages of the response that would lead to 
Afghanistan and Guantanamo, is ‘subjectively perceived and hence brought into 
existence through narrative and discourse’.110  The possibility of the state imposing a 
new foreign policy trajectory ‘resides not only in the ability to respond to crises, but 
to identify, define and constitute crisis’.111  The ‘right’ and ‘ability’ to impose such a 
new trajectory relied upon the success of the articulation of the events of 9-11 – as 
symptomatic of a wider crisis – and on the success of the articulation of the decisive 
intervention that deemed a ‘War on Terror’ as urgent.   
 
To be ‘successful’ constructions of crisis, which compete with each other, must 
achieve resonance with key populations.112  Bush achieved considerable resonance in 
narrating a crisis discourse.  He did ‘a remarkable job of defining the attacks of 
September 11 to his advantage’.113  Bush’s framing of a crisis discourse was ‘a key 
factor in his success’, elevating him from a perceived poor leader to an increasingly 
popular wartime President.114    This resonance was aided by the scale and shock of 9-
11 combined with the relative paucity of alternative crisis narratives; the void 
strategically selected in favour of the construction of crisis mobilised by the Bush 
government.  Hay notes that ‘crisis discourses operate by identifying minor alterations 
in the routine texture of social life’, iterative changes are recruited by the discourse 
and presented as symptomatic of the general condition of crisis.115  Just as the void 
operated as a highly individualised lived experience, as is reflected in the nature of 
personal testaments and widely located popular cultural sources of meaning, the 9-11 
crisis became lived in the terms articulated in the crisis discourse.116   With 9-11, 
clearly social life was impacted, foreign policy practitioners did not have to work hard 
to accrue incremental changes in everyday life symptomatic of a wider crisis 
condition; the hole in the cityscape and trauma that followed ensured a sense of 
rupture was easily established.117  The crisis, like the void before it, was lived at a 
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relatively (unusually and surprisingly) personal level.118  The major difference from 
the void to the crisis arose in the harmonisation of meaning across the population; if 
on 11 September the events of the day were relatively meaning-less, in the days that 
followed, the meaning of 9-11 was increasingly homogenous and hegemonic.119  Only 
three days after the events, the general public began to read and articulate 9-11 
through emerging official discourse(s): 
 “[It was a] crime against humanity”.120 
“[It] was an attack on our society, on our way of life … an attack on free life 
in general”.121 
 
Even though 9-11 was initially meaning-less, the ‘nature’ of 9-11 selected for and 
against certain constructions, in exactly the same manner as the wider context of 
foreign policy culture and the domestic political landscape.122  Just as Gerard Toal 
notes that it was unsurprising for Bush to reach into foreign policy culture and re-
articulate enduring or forgotten foreign policy discourses, the attacks, whilst 
contingent, made certain courses of action more likely (and possess a greater chance 
of resonating widely) than others.123  ‘Discursive constructions of crisis are doubly 
constrained by the ‘symptoms’ it must narrate and by its ability to find resonance with 
the experiences to which such symptoms give rise’.124  This is why the 
incomprehensible nature of 9-11 in the void fed so well into the inexplicable nature of 
9-11 constructed in the crisis discourse.  The success of a crisis discourse depends not 
on an ability to accurately map the complexity of perceived webs of causation – it is 
of course to the constructions of crisis, not some extra-discursive ‘reality’ of failure 
that narratives must attest to – but ‘on their ability to provide a simplified account 
sufficiently flexible to ‘narrate’ a great variety of morbid symptoms whilst 
unambiguously attributing causality and responsibility’.125  In this, the ‘War on 
Terror’, as a discursive project, excelled. 
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Before subsuming new events into its narrative, the first events that the emerging (and 
increasingly hegemonic) discourse had to account for were previous instances of 
‘terrorist evil’.  The 1993 World Trade Center bombing, the 1998 attacks on US 
embassies in Tanzania and Kenya, and the 2000 attack on the USS Cole were quickly 
incorporated within the emerging dominant discourse.  The construction of a 
chronological lineage of events leading up to 9-11 was so strong that interviewees 
noted it was “startling [that people] didn’t link [the] previous … pattern of 
activities”.126  Crucially however, certain ‘morbid symptoms’ were deliberately 
excluded by the official discourse.  The agency of the general public to interpret, 
modify, reject and resist the official response is of course important to acknowledge.  
While the official discourse was widely accepted, alternatives were proffered.  Those 
voicing alternative interpretations of 9-11 were more likely to draw parallels to the 
1995 Oklahoma City bombing than instances of ‘foreign terrorism’ or even Pearl 
Harbor.127 
 
The response of the general public was at times particularly erudite, and amounted to 
a form of resistance to the emerging official foreign policy discourse: 
“[All President Bush] uses are buzz words like evil, good, resolve and you’d 
think he was talking about a Star Wars movie or something”.128 
“Bush said … ‘War on Terrorism’ … [it’s a] contradiction in terms”.129 
Nonetheless, the emerging official discourse resonated widely in both its ability to fill 
the void with meaning and to incorporate new events within it.  Elements of official 
discourse were widely repeated by interviewees when discussing the US and the new 
enemy; nationalism and unity were paramount, opposed to a denigrated, subhuman 
enemy:   
“I never really understood what the American flag stood for … I’m very proud 
to be an American; that’s what I learnt from this”.130 
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“We’re dealing with people who have the mind of a snake; not human beings 
… We’re in a different world; we’re in a free world … we don’t think that 
way … very cowardice … there’s no sense of humanity whatsoever  ... We’re 
not barbaric; we’re just not that sort of people”.131 
“How can they live among us and not see kindness?”132 
“They’re substandard people … they’re subhuman … anti-human … from a 
diseased corner of the world … with a diseased mindset”.133 
The strength of patriotic feeling generated after 9-11 was reflected in the question, “If 
not, why are you not flying the flag?”134  Flying the flag was now the default position.  
Not doing so made a larger and louder statement than doing so.135  Nevertheless, 
although ‘unity’ and ‘freedom’ were increasingly used in opposition to ‘terror’, there 
was a risk that the emerging official discourse would lose its grip with time.  Two and 
a half weeks after 9-11, one interviewee noted that “it’s kind of wearing off … people 
are getting more … it’s hit them already … and they’re slowing down … nothing else 
has really happened”.136  The start of October, however, brought a series of ‘anthrax 
attacks’ and numerous ‘white powder scares’ across the country.   
 
Just as certain past events, such as embassy bombings and the USS Cole, were 
incorporated within the increasingly dominant discourse, so too were new events.  
The official discourse was capable of narrating these new ‘morbid symptoms’ as part 
of the underlying condition.  It is with the anthrax scares that it is possible to see the 
dominant discourse becoming increasingly hegemonic.  Far away from New York and 
Washington DC, ‘white powder scares’ were experienced, made sense of and 
commented on through the wider discourse of the emerging ‘War on Terror’.  By mid 
October in Newfoundland, Canada, after being detained in response to a ‘white 
powder scare’, one interviewee observed, “the war reached here … [we could] see it 
from the inside”.137  Successfully narrating the anthrax scares as new symptoms of the 
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identified terror threat solidified the dominance of the official ‘War on Terror’ 
discourse at a time when alternatives were forming in opposition to intervention in 
Afghanistan.138  The ability of the emerging official discourse to narrate old and new 
symptoms of crisis ensured its survival and dominance; it would not be until 2003 that 
the hegemony of meaning production in foreign policy discourse would once again 
come under significant challenge. 
 
 
‘9-11’ as Somatic Marker 
 
Drawing on William Connolly’s research in neurophysiology, Gerard Toal argues that 
‘9-11’ has come to act as a somatic marker.139  Succinctly, Toal argues that through 
our ‘biophysical’ encounters with the world, humans mix the cultural into the 
corporeal.  Where these mixtures of the cultural and corporeal come together somatic 
markers may occur.  For Connolly, a somatic marker is a ‘a culturally mobilized, 
corporeal disposition through which affect-imbued, preliminary orientations to 
perceptions and judgment scale down the material factored into cost-benefit analyses, 
principled judgments, and reflective experiments’.140  Thus a somatic marker 
underpins higher-order thought and deliberation as an organising and categorising 
capacity.  As a mixture of the cultural and the biophysical, a somatic marker operates 
‘below the threshold of reflection and structured by affect-saturated memory and “gut 
feelings”, it simplifies and speeds the process of calculative reasoning so that every 
decision is relatively instantaneous, rather than a rational-choice marathon’.141 
 
Here we come full circle as we see that the elevation of 9-11 to a position of Absolute 
Evil is facilitated through the somatic marker of ‘9-11’.  Connolly makes his 
argument by drawing on the example of the intense collective memories of the 
Holocaust held by many European Jews.  The term ‘Holocaust’ acts as a somatic 
marker conjuring ‘complex memories on the higher, linguistic register and taps into 
the visceral dimension of the trauma, an intense set of feelings that gather in the gut, 
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the muscles, and the pallor of the skin’.142  The intense collective memories held by 
many Americans of 9-11, experienced through the shared position as ‘viewers’, have 
frequently been triggered and invoked in the ensuing ‘War on Terror’.  ‘When people 
with such intense collective memories face new circumstances that trigger them, a set 
of dispositions to perception, feeling, interpretation, and action are called into 
play’.143  The set of dispositions to perception, feeling and action generated by the 
somatic marker of ‘9-11’ serve to promote particular policies whilst marginalising 
others.   
 
In the ‘War on Terror’, speaking of ‘9-11’ is to invoke ‘an obsessive collective 
experience of trauma and loss’ that operates without the need for higher-order 
contemplation.144  Speaking of 9-11 in the ‘War on Terror’ has been to unleash an 
‘affective tsunami’.145  The dominance of official US foreign policy discourse in the 
‘War on Terror’, including the hegemonic framing of 9-11, has ensured that speaking 
of 9-11 brings to the fore issues of resentment and desire.  Speaking of 9-11 is to 
speak of the desire to avenge an instance of Absolute Evil through the muscular 
reassertion of US sovereignty; 9-11 as a somatic marker is fixed with and brings forth 
the truths of Jacksonian America.146   
 
As was argued in chapter 3, Bush was comfortable with and adept at operating within 
the Jacksonian foreign policy tradition.  It is unsurprising that intervention in 
Afghanistan followed a Jacksonian logic of the counterpunch: of defending American 
honour.  The central tenets of Jacksonian foreign policy thinking were central to the 
official foreign policy discourse of the Bush administration.  Those who had failed to 
obey the rules were no longer protected by them; they must be brought to justice and 
they could be brought to justice in any way as they had forfeited their rights by decree 
of their actions.  ‘9-11’ as somatic marker not only brought to the fore the notion of 
an instance of Absolute Evil, it also brought forward the solution: fight terrorism and 
kill terrorists.147  ‘9-11’ as a somatic marker, memorialising a moment of crisis, 
invoked both the tragedy and the solution to prevent its reoccurrence.  In the ‘War on 
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Terror’, ‘9-11’ could be invoked to justify a hyper-masculinised, warrior culture in 
society and in foreign policy thinking.  The affect of ‘9-11’ as somatic marker thus 
mirrors the wider societal shifts Susan Faludi astutely documents.148  These shifts 
were reflected not only in the need for John Kerry to ‘prove his metal’ by attempting 
to out-hunt President Bush, but also in the increasingly harmonised meaning of 9-11 
and the solution to the crisis it now represented.  As the meaning of 9-11 began to 
harmonise, interviewees frequently espoused distinctly Jacksonian views: 
“This event spurned a lot of anger in me … I hope they get him, I hope they 
torture him ... As discomforting as it is for me, I want them to bomb the hell 
out of Afghanistan ... kill them all”.149 
“If I was twenty I’d be signing up for the army … I feel that we should deal 
with them accordingly, as to what they have done to our country … that type 
of people do not deserve to live … I think we should attack and take those 
people out of this world … I don’t think they deserve to live after what they 
have done to our country”.150 
“[Our] main goal should be the eradication or locating of people 
responsible”.151 
“[We should] take care of the situation no matter what the costs may be … 
World War, whatever … I’m all for war … we need to strike back ten times 
harder than they struck us … by any means necessary”.152 
“We had to do something about it; we can’t just sit back and let them punch us 
in the face”.153 
“[We should] drop nuclear weapons on ‘em … Wipe Afghanistan off the face 
of the earth”.154 
“We should quit pussyfooting around … when you go hunting, when you 
wound something, you don’t leave it to suffer”.155 
 
The strength of feeling in the above quotations is simultaneously startling and entirely 
predictable.  They exemplify Jacksonian desires for retribution and the regaining of 
American honour through force.  They also demonstrate why saying ‘9-11’ has been 
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such a potent political tool during the ‘War on Terror’.  Opposing increased military 
spending, suggesting less bellicose and more dialogical approaches to foreign policy 
and arguing for the rights of those who have committed acts of terrorism are 
incredibly difficult stances to take when the topography of the debate is shaped by a 
particular framing of 9-11.  This framing elevated 9-11 to a position of Absolute Evil, 
similarly to the Holocaust.  Within this framing, 9-11 is not only inexplicable, 
attempts at understanding and explanation are threatening as they fail to recognise the 
need for assertive, pre-emptive foreign policy.156 
 
By showing that the meaning of 9-11 and the response that followed are cultural not 
natural, this chapter attempts to demonstrate the contingency of foreign policy.  The 
construction of crisis identified both that 9-11 represented a critical underlying 
condition and the solution to confront and remedy it.  Outside of the US (and even 
amongst minorities within) this dominant construction was contested.  Whether or not 
9-11 is an instance of Absolute Evil; whether 9-11 can be analysed and understood; 
whether 9-11 was an act of war, an act of God, a crime, or something else; whether or 
not 9-11 was an attack on freedom, on capitalism, on a way of life, on a state or a 
civilisation; whether the perpetrators were barbarians; whether they acted alone or 
represented a state, a religion or a networked group; and whether the perpetrators and 
their associates are capable of compassion, reason or rational thought all influence the 
possible, logical and necessary response to the events of September 11th 2001.  ‘9-11’ 
as somatic marker operates to inhibit the possibility and need for such considerations, 
severely curtailing the ability to contemplate and realise different courses of action.   
 
 
Conclusion 
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The wrong (the disproving of perceived security truths) and the lack (the failure to 
narrate) were the twin arms of the void that held Americans in a stunned, silent 
embrace.  It cannot be happening (it is wrong, we are right) and it is not real (it does 
not fit within reality as we know it, it is unimaginable) came to epitomise these twin 
components of the void.  The shattering of deep and enduring truths of US security 
culture were compounded by the impossibility of existing, contemporary foreign 
policy discourses subsuming the events and the initial inability of foreign policy 
practitioners to narrate 9-11 from scratch.  The media too struggled to establish 
meaning, opting instead for looped images of the events and a drive to emphasise the 
very incomprehensibility of 9-11.  The events of 9-11 thus appeared to return history 
to the US, shattering politics and returning the political to American life.   
 
Succinctly, 9-11 created a discursive void; this ‘void in meaning’ acted as a vacuum 
for the official foreign policy discourse that would follow in the response.157  The 
analogy of a vacuum portrays the emptiness and the difficulty of talking in the void.  
It also helps us understand how official foreign policy discourse articulating the 
response entered the discursive vacuum, filling it almost instantly through 
dissemination, repetition and amplification.  The void was unwelcome as the lack of 
meaning created unease.  Hence the desire to fill it and (re)establish a compelling 
narrative was strong, helping to create a situation whereby the words of foreign policy 
practitioners took on heightened significance.  The nature of the void not only 
heightened the significance of the framing that grafted meaning onto 9-11, it also 
shaped the construction of crisis as the first stage of the response. 
 
Theorising crisis has raised three important points.  Firstly, crises are discursive but 
context dependent.  Crisis is ‘a process’, in which language dominates.158  Crises are 
not objective ‘facts’ that result from the accumulation of contradictions; they are 
subjective and thus rely on the discursive construction of events as symptomatic of a 
wider condition of crisis.  Contradiction, rupture and/or failure can sustain numerous 
competing constructions of crisis, but the context of the events and the wider 
domestic context strategically select for certain narrations over others.  The cultural 
condition that created the incomprehensibility of 9-11 in the void facilitated the 
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discursive construction of 9-11 as inexplicable in the emerging discourse of the 
response. 
 
Secondly, as ‘the most important instrument in crisis management is language’, ‘those 
who are able to define what the crisis is all about hold the key to defining the 
appropriate strategies for its resolution’.159  Defining the solution is fundamental to 
the construction of crisis.  This solution depends on the display and re-location of 
agency through a decisive intervention; a decisive intervention and agency are central 
to the construction of crisis.  Narrating the events of 9-11 had to be coupled to a 
vision for a new foreign policy trajectory that would prevent their reoccurrence.  As 
Koselleck notes, ‘the question of the historical future is inherent in the crisis’.160  In 
writing the solution and the direction of the future, the agency of foreign policy 
practitioners is vitally important.  Moreover, the construction of 9-11 as crisis served 
to concentrate agency at the heart of government; ‘crisis is a process in which the site 
of political decision-making shifts from the disaggregated institutions, policy 
communities, networks and practices of the state apparatus to the state as a centralised 
and dynamic agent’.161  The reassertion of politics over the political required the 
heightened concentration of state agency at the very centre of government.  In 
summary, despite being discursive, as evidenced in a decisive intervention, both 
context and agency are central to an understanding of crisis. 
 
Thirdly, the importance of discourse, context and agency to the construction of crises 
brings to the fore issues of framing.  The Bush government wielded considerable 
power in ‘the ability to frame the discursive context within which political 
subjectivities are constituted and re-constituted’.162  Alternative framings were 
possible, even if the context of 9-11 strategically selected for certain narratives.163  It 
seems self-evident that 9-11 was intimately related to the ‘War on Terror’, but this 
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common sense must be made strange.  It was not inevitable that the ‘War on Terror’ 
would follow 9-11.  Rather 9-11 had to first be constructed in a particular and 
contingent way.  This construction relied upon the articulation of 9-11 as crisis.  As 
Croft notes, ‘crises are pivotal points in understanding the development of policy’; 
‘the war on terror emerged as the dominant discourse through the crisis of 2001’.164  
Theorising crisis is thus a necessary step towards understanding how the ‘War on 
Terror’ was possible and contesting the policies and practices that comprise it.  This 
chapter has thus laid the foundations for a comparative analysis of coalition foreign 
policy discourse.  Chapter 5 analyses the foreign policy discourse of the response, 
begun and shaped by the construction of 9-11 as crisis. 
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